

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ CIA INTERNAL
ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

SR/Red []

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

REC'D

FWD'D

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

FI/STD/CE []

3 OCT
1957

9m

2.

be read to me
Wed, Oct 2, 1957

3.

[]

JHR
JHC

4.

5.

SR/Red

1046
J

10g

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

7.

SR/2 []

9 OCT 1957 9 OCT 1957

JHR

Pls. read top of []

8.

SR/2/Lat.

7-8: The dossier on
BALODIS - concerned the
mechanism KOLTA only.
and could not be
identified with KOLTA.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

file in []

☒ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ CIA INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐ UNCLASSIFIED

#1
30 December 1953

JK
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/2

CAMUSO 3

SUBJECT : Operational/AECOB - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Progress Report
for December 1953

1. Five W/T messages were received from CAMUSO 3, all of them consistently containing both fixed-text and communications control and compromise indicators showing the agent is under Soviet control.

2. Message No. 11 contained positive economic intelligence and has been evaluated as "probably true".

3. Message No. 14 contained positive military intelligence and concerned the drafting and induction into military units of certain age groups of the population. This information has been evaluated "probably true" and confirms other reports as well as a published announcement in the Soviet press of September that such a draft was planned.

4. Message No. 12 is operational and has to do with the freedom from militia controls. The information contained is considered to be probably false.

5. It is not considered likely by the undersigned that the opposition would jeopardize their investment in this agent by transmitting - at this time - other than true information, particularly information of relatively minor importance such as that contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 above. As yet, the opposition does not appear to be "building up" this agent to the point where we will accept him as a major source of good intelligence and thereby become targets for their deception material. It is the undersigned's opinion that the opposition, rather than utilizing the agent as a channel for deception material intends to employ him primarily as a means of neutralizing our present and future assets in the Latvian SSR. This view, although somewhat premature, may partially explain the motives for transmitting the information in paragraph 4 above. A further indication to support this view is the agent's message No. 4 wherein he recommends an individual for use as a support point for future arrivals.

6. Message No. 14 (referring to the draft and present whereabouts of the draftees) offered an obvious opening for a future course of action on our part. Inasmuch as CAMUSO 3 was reporting the present location of the draftees (in Riga), their military units, and expected future assignments, and since he has no direct access to Riga, it would probably be logical for us to arrive at the assumption that his source of information could only be derived through contacts or sub-contacts with parents of various draftees who are in correspondence with their sons in Riga.

*or from overt information
negotiations.*

JK

file in

3

It had been our intention, then, to follow up this opportunity by requiring CAMUSO 3 to specifically identify all draftees known by him, the means whereby he obtained such information (presumably this would be as outlined above - it is difficult to conceive of any other plausible explanation by the Soviets) and all information he has about their units. The next step would be to require him to maintain contact with his sources and report all changes in the draftees or their units' duty stations. Probably no information of real intelligence value would be derived by such a step; it would, however, result in materially increasing the pressure on the opposition by forcing them to fabricate once they were maneuvered into the desired position and committed themselves. This possibility may have been foreseen on their part and may have been a motive for message No. 15 discussed below.

7. Message No. 15 conveys greetings to CAMUSO 3's "family" and states that in the near future he will change his place of residence to another point far removed (approx. 200 Km.) from his present location. This sudden unexplained move may have been occasioned (a) in order to forestall any course of action by us such as outlined in paragraph 6, or (b) in order to increase - eventually - his apparent attractiveness as a support point. Since his future location is only 20 Km from the coast, we could logically be expected to utilize an agent so strategically situated for either reception for a sea landing or as a support point for exfiltration operations. Furthermore, since he now will have access to the coast and since he has inquired about means of exfiltration in several past messages, a definite problem will be encountered should CAMUSO 3 start producing all sorts of assets including a reception party and request a boat be sent. This will be particularly the case should he produce a legally living individual who appears attractive and desires to exfiltrate with CAMUSO 3. (Message No. 13 states he is continuing his search for such an individual.) It is felt that possibility (b) above serves to further support the hypothesis of paragraph 5.

8. A further aspect that must be considered is the fact that CAMUSO 3 requests his greetings be conveyed to his "family". Although CAMUSO 3 has other relatives, it is presumed he refers to his closest ones who are a common law wife and son presently in Germany. CAMUSO 3 is known to be extremely fond of them and is no doubt concerned about their welfare, particularly since at the time of his dispatch they were in the middle of processing for emigration to the U.S. and also possessed no assets or means of livelihood other than our promise to provide financial support. Up to the time of this final message, CAMUSO 3 has never referred to his family even indirectly and has never made any inquiry concerning them. This is only logical if we accept the premise that he has not revealed their existence to the Soviets, since if he had, mention of his family would have appeared in the traffic as part of their portrayal of a free agent and as something we would normally expect CAMUSO 3 to do. Since CAMUSO 3 has been able to retain the greater part of his control and compromise indicators, it is not reasonable to believe he would divulge the existence of his family in Germany since he well realizes the consequences of such a disclosure and would, no doubt, conceal them to the very end even after giving

They have no idea of his present location.

coast
Bulet
Gulf

maybe

what day?

Are we checking on the family? We better keep an eye on them.

*TH23 - I don't think the body to
 If they have this thing family.
 the day I was at this I
 the first they need to find for the*

up all his control signs. It is felt much more likely that the opposition has either learned of his family through independent means in Germany or that they are merely "fishing" for confirmation of a suspicion they may have that CAMUSO 3 is holding out. The latter alternative seems more likely, and if such is indeed the case, the consequences of the Soviets identifying his family are obvious. It is therefore proposed that the next message to CAMUSO 3 contain a query to him as to what family he is talking about. ?

OK

9. It is felt that under the present circumstances the next message to CAMUSO 3 consist solely of queries as to the reasons for his move and all details concerning it and his present conditions. It is anticipated that the next message from CAMUSO 3 will probably purport to originate from his new location. Pending the receipt of such a message, specific intelligence requirements for that location will be obtained from SR/6 and have already been requested. The long-range and major problem, it is felt, is in formulating a plan whereby we would be able to forestall an eventuality such as outlined in paragraph 7 (b) and prevent the opposition from placing us in a position wherein we could not logically refuse to commit ourselves. This aspect will be taken up with CSR/CE and a long range plan to guard against this eventuality will be formulated with his concurrence. Meanwhile the handling of CAMUSO 3 will be continued with the objectives in mind of primarily securing positive intelligence, and secondarily with overtaking the opposition's assets.

I don't think it will come up.

If it does the common is simply seen explicit strategy in the half is only good change much better than the old see

[]

For immediate future prefer to play up HGR/MIA rpt. with MAZEVKOV as introduced in MEMO NR 7. Para 7 suggestions alone may be made easier, - would be better review situation about.

TH2

See attached next